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Abstract  
Based on a modification of the indispensability argument, the paper claims that fictions are indispensable, thus 
true, and simultaneously rejects any ontological commitment to fictional entities. In the first part, data coming 
from natural language semantics are gathered to argue for a disconnection between truth and ontology, against 
Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment. In the second part, we exploit analyses from literary criticism and 
philosophy of art to support the indispensability of fiction, and to account for a strong sense of truth of fiction. In 
the background of the paper lies the idea that fictional narrations pertain to the interpretative and practical uses 
rather than to any descriptive use of language. 
 
Introduction 
The indispensability of mathematics thesis of Quine and Putnam, implicitly involving Quine’s 
ontological commitment criterion, leads us to accom modate mathematical entities within our 
ontology. Such a com bination of the thesis (of indispensability) and the criterion (of 
commitment) appears to be a prevalent paradi gm in analytic philosophy, as far as one is 
concerned with ontological issues. The specific case of fictional narrations is consequently 
promptly shrugged off: since they are not indi spensable, such narrations cannot be true (an 
idea already present in Frege), hence they do not commit us to anything. The purpose of the 
paper is to show that the com bination of the thesis and the criterion is not transposable to 
fiction in a straightforward way. To em brace fictional narration, one needs to distinguish 
between two moments, admit of a kind of indispensability, thus a kind of truth in the fiction, 
while rejecting ontological commitment regarding fictional entities. 
Our argument in not ad hoc, tailor-m ade for fi ction. It is grounded in a criticism  of the 
narrowness of the context of application of  Quine’s com bination. Following Frege, Quine 
indeed restricts his logical analysis to som e very specific use of language: that of scientific 
knowledge, if not theorized know ledge, of the world. Moreover, both authors agree that 
natural language (hereafter NL) is not a good m edia to express our theories, and that we 
should either go through a Begriffsschrift freed from  vernacular languages’ am biguities 
(Frege), or translate (or “regim ent”) our theoretical sentences into the canonical language 
offered by first-order logic (Quine). 
It is quite obvious that uses of language are not  restricted to the only cases of theoretic or 
scientific sentences, and more generally that they are confined neither to the expression of our 
knowledge, nor to that of descriptions of the wo rld. Far from formalized theories, we are also 
involved in the practical game of multiple interpretations of the world and of our fellow 
creatures, and these interpretations do not seem  reducible to m ore or less naturalized 
descriptions. Here we follow a traditional distinction between explication and comprehension, 
i.e. between the positive m ethod of natural sc iences and the herm eneutic method of m oral 
sciences (see Descombes 1995: 51). The contrast  is indeed endorsed by Quine him self with 
the principle of a “double standard” (Quine 1960:  § 45), i.e. of a sharp separation between 
what is knowable (which can be theorized, natura lized, etc.) and intentional issues (which are 
practically manageable, but where there is nothing to be known). 
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Indispensability, which is a good path to reach  truth, need not be reserved for the only 
descriptive, epistemic and theoretical uses language. We will propose to expand it to every 
discourse involved in our understanding or comprehension of the world, indeed in our 
practical apprehension of the world (if it is extended to non linguistic know-how). W e 
propose to characterize as true the discourses wh ich are indispensable to our apprehension of 
the world, including the non-theoretical one. In orde r to avoid the threat of relativism  – truth 
being defined by utility not only in our descriptions  but also in our interpretations – we draw 
our inspiration from Dennett (1987) whose purpose is to build bridges between interpretation 
and description, over the double standard gap: a criterion of usefulness enables him to involve 
intentionality into our theoretical explan ations, although it is on the “dark side” for 
knowledge.  
Furthermore, far from  any canonical and id eal language, we are all involved in m any 
practices of natural language where som e of the assumptions of formal languages are merely 
removed. The strong connection drawn up between bound variable and ontological 
commitment appears to be dependent on the som ewhat ethereal atm osphere of first-order 
logical languages. The well-known criticism  of Russell’s theory of descriptions (1905) by 
Strawson (1950) is one of the rem arkable manifestations of the im portance of pragm atic 
features in linguistic understanding, whereas these features are completely absent from formal 
languages. Since then, NL semanticists had to include numerous phenomena related to the use 
of language in context. The upshot is a picture of  language (as it is spoken) that is far richer 
than the picture Quine relied on to shape his ontological commitment criterion. We propose to 
embrace that richness, and to give up the criterion. 
Our strategy is as f ollows. We want to disent angle two aspects of  Quine’s indispensability 
argument, which appear to be m utually independent. First, there is an entailm ent from 
indispensability to truth: if some (theoretical) discourse – like mathematics – is indispensable 
for our holistic explanation of the world, then  it must be acknowledged as true. Second, there 
is an im plication between truth and ontology : this is Quine’s criterion of  ontological 
commitment. We will claim that one should ge neralize the relation between indispensability 
and truth, and also cut the link between tr uth and ontology. The resulting position regarding 
fiction will be that one can acknowledge truth in fiction, but with no ontological com mitment 
to fictional entities. 
The argument of the paper is a two-step one. First we will argue negatively against the 
universality of Quine’s ontological com mitment criterion, i.e. for an interpretation of NL 
quantification (and more generally, of NL semantics) as ontologically neutral. This part is not 
specifically linked to fictional discourse sin ce it is intended to account for the way language 
works in general. The idea is that at an inte rpretation level, one can handle quantifiers, proper 
names, and even truth, without prejudice to what  happens at an external level. In a second 
part, we will argue positively in favor of indisp ensability, hence truth in a strong sense, for 
fictional discourse. The issue will thus be to shed light on the kind of  truth that can be 
involved in some non-descriptive use of language. 
 
PART 1. TRUTH WITH NO ONTOLOGICAL COMMITMENT 
In this part, we will argue against Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment. We will claim 
that it is linked to som e partial view of language , and that it should not be applied as such in 
more general cases, especially to fictiona l discourse. Actually, such a criterion seem s 
appropriate for very idealized situations, where the context of use does not play any role and 
the utterances can be interpreted using only se mantic vs. pragm atic resources. To put it in 
other words: as far as context is out of play, Quine’s criterion might be in – and vice versa. 
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In the background, we have to stress the c ontrast between two m ajor conceptions of 
semantics: (i) a representational conception, according to which semantic theories account for 
the relations between language and reality, and (ii) a procedural view, according to which 
semantics should provide explanations of the language users’ understanding of the meaning of 
sentences and discourses. We will show that Qu ine’s conception is of the first kind, whereas 
natural language sem anticists often shift to conceptions of the second kind. This shift is 
expected to yield important consequences about the purported connection between sem antics 
and ontology. 
 
1. The universalistic tradition 
The representational view of sem antics clearly dominates the origins of logical analysis. 
Actually, Frege’s apprehension of sem antics and Russell’s are com parable in that, whatever 
specific theory is considered the best one, sem antic correlates of at least singular expressions 
automatically carry som e ontology about them . And according to m any followers and 
commentators, after accurate regimentation not only singular terms, but also every expression 
of language, trigger an ontological com mitment. In this received view, Frege and Russell 
seem to have admitted semantic correlates of general terms (concepts and senses of  concepts, 
or Universals), and of sentences (truth-value s and thoughts, or Propositions), as ontologically 
relevant in the same manner as singular terms. Consequently, ontology exactly maps language 
as semantically theorized (and reciprocally): when semantics is dualistic, such as Frege’s, the 
world splits into (at least) two parts (an intensional part and an extensional one); 1 if it is 
monistic, such as Russell’s, one world is sufficient.  
This “ontologizing” understanding of semantics, which seems to have been shared by m any 
after Frege and Russell if not by them selves, entails m eta-theoretical choices throughout 
language analysis, e.g. the particularly intri cate treatment of empty singular terms by Frege 
who wanted to avoid any com mitment to fictional entities. Russell’s drastic reduction of  the 
category of genuine singular terms, though connected to epistemic features, follows the same 
tack, as do contemporary “neo-Russellian” criticisms of the legitimacy of individual concepts. 
At odds with Frege and Russell, Quine explicitly restricts ontological com mitment to one 
syntactic category, namely variables. This is his well-known criterion: 
“To be is to be the value of a variable” (Quine 1948) 
Quine’s strategy enables one to use predicat es and to assert sentences without being 
committed to platonic objects such as Universa ls or Propositions; therefore, Quine’s account 
may look somewhat like nominalism, although it is still full-fledged realism about particulars. 
Thanks to Quine’s accordance with universalism ,2 such syntactically delim ited ontology is 
still conceived of as genuine ontology: as there is one language – first-order logic being the 
canonical language of regim entation of science – and one world – see Quine’s disinterest in 
model-theory, or his rejection of m odal logic –, language is always related to reality. The 
restriction of ontological com mitment to variab les thus does not im ply any shift from  the 
classical view of semantics as representational. 
                                                 
1 Each part m ay split again according to syntactic cate gories (singular term s, general terms, sentences). 
Moreover, Frege’s ont ology adds anot her world, corresponding to the connotative or “subject ive” aspects of 
language (which are not accounted for by its semantics). 
2 See van Heijenoort (1967) and Hintikka (1988) for th e distinction between two traditions in logic: the 
universalistic tradition and the model-theoretic tradition, respectively involving two rival views about language: 
language-as-medium vs. language-as-calculus. 
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After the so-called “linguistic turn” in ph ilosophy, Quine’s conception of ontology and of 
(extensional) semantics became the m ost prominent framework for different fam ilies of 
metaphysical realists, who consider som e or all of the sem antic items as bona fide, i.e. 
ontologically relevant, objects. 3 Moreover, technical issues with in logical semantics such as 
the status of individual concepts are ge nerally challenged while presupposing Quine’s 
criterion. It should yet be noticed that Quine never claim ed to account for linguistic meaning, 
a notion he held to be suspicious, and that his regimentation explicitly parts f rom sense-
preservation or synonymy (Quine 1960, §33).  
Quine’s support for universalistic ideas actually  entails a strong connection between logic 
and ontology, whereas the implicated meta-theoretical constraints seem to have forced him to 
depart from a complete explication of natural language semantics (and from a great part of the 
technical logic developments). The universalistic conception of sem antics thus appears to be 
strongly normative, since what there (presumably)  is intervenes as a coercion through 
language analysis, and leads to revisionist strategies. To put it in a nutshell: Quine’s 
conception implies that ontological considerations come first, and that sem antic theories (an 
particularly procedural semantics) should adapt or die. 
 
2. The model-theoretic turn 
Tarski opened new perspectives in and on semantics. His system atic meta-theoretical 
approach to sem antics entails, by itself, the possibility of language-shifts; going further, 
model theory allows world-shifts, i.e. reinterpretations of language. The expansion of Quine’s 
criterion to the new m odel-theoretic frame leads one to identify ontology with the dom ain of 
an interpretation structure of a form alized language. Such identification m ay be labeled as 
Model-Realism (hereafter, MR). Though inherited from  universalism, MR seem s to be the 
dominant position since Tarski’s sem antic turn; according to this view, sem antics should 
consist of (or depend on) representational theories. 
Let us call that language-and-sem antics-relative “ontology” – i.e. the constituents of the 
domain(s) of a structure – the Technical Semantic Ontology (hereafter, TSO). Does it m ake 
sense to think of TSO as genuine ontology, i.e. as what there is?4 It seems intuitively that if  
one expects it to m ake sense, one needs to choose a single language and a single semantic 
interpretation of that language as the best ones. 5 In other words, TSO seem s to be genuine 
ontology… if we choose to go back to universalism. 
At first glance, Tarski-type sem antics could explain the genuine relation holding between 
(some) language and (som e) world. It looks as  if it could explain truth as a correspondence 
between language and world (regim ented as an interpretation structure). It m ay – and did – 
consequently reinforce the “ontologizing” conception of sem antics advocated by Quine’s 
criterion. 
At the sam e time, Tarski-type sem antics allows natural and straightforward solutions for 
issues raised within Fregean and Russellian sem antics, such as the problem of empty singular 
terms. For instance, in order to provide a truth-functional sem antics for fiction, one can easily 
quantify over a dom ain of fictional objects; whether one favors direct-referential vs. 
                                                 
3 Many contemporary logical accounts of the semantics of fiction do not cut off from this general conception. 
See Gochet (2010) for a brief overview.  
4 In Carnap’s words (1950), t he issue is to know whether internal questions of existence should be identified 
with external questions.  
5 In the same way for instance that Quine avoids semantic variability: he roughly rules out possible (non-actual) 
worlds, and chooses the holistic language of science. 
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descriptivist theories, the very sam e domain can provide (fictional) “referents” for (fictional) 
proper names conceived as rigid designators. Does such a tolerance im ply any ontological 
commitment to f ictional entities? If  Quine’s criterion is to be carried over to m odel theory, 
TSO (here “fictional objects”) will then cons titute a genuine ontology. Sem anticists should 
consequently either assume some very liberal and luxuriant ontology – taking fictional entities 
at face value –, or attem pt to avoid this co mmitment by some theoretical revision. The sam e 
goes for possible-worlds semantics according to whether one is willing to com mit oneself to 
“possible objects” or not. 
Ontology-oriented or representational semantics again appears to im pose strong constraints 
on theories. It is embodied in the meta-theoretical choice to split usual singular terms into two 
categories in line with ontology. 6 In spite of (possible) appearances, a descriptivist Russell-
like understanding of usual proper nam es is no exception to the rule: if a definite description 
is vacuous and occupies a subject position, the whole sentence is system atically false and 
therefore entails lots of unintended consequences. 
Such a com plication of sem antic theories is  already questionable. W e also think it is 
illegitimate. A strong argum ent in favor of non- committing semantics – i.e. against MR – is 
the theoretical uniformity it allows. 7 It is not sufficient by itself but can be warranted on 
methodological grounds, as follows. 
In his criticism s of Donnellan’s sem inal paper about descriptive and referential uses of 
descriptions, Kripke (1977) argues for “unitary  theories” against “theories that postulate 
[semantic] ambiguity”, if the alleged am biguity is not expected “to be disam biguated by 
separate and unrelated words in som e other language”; so, against Donnellan’s (1966) 
conception of semantic values shifting with uses of description, Kripke favors an account “on 
pragmatic grounds, encapsulated in the distincti on between speaker’s reference and sem antic 
reference” (op.cit.: 3c). 
While splitting usual singular term s into tw o classes according to (som e presumed) 
ontology, Model-Realists postulate a kind of (superfluous) linguistic am biguity: semantic 
values of expressions are supposed  to shift with m utations in presumed ontology. For 
example, the same usual proper nam e “Santa Claus”, as used by a believing child or by his 
skeptical parents, would have different semantic interpretations.8  
As far as sem antic theories are concerned with linguistic meaning, it is quite am azing to 
postulate shifts of values with changes of (ontological) beliefs.9 In f act, the distinction 
between these two uses cannot be adequately  captured by Tarski-type sem antics. What 
happens, for instance, when the parents and thei r child speak together of “Santa Claus”? How 
can non-believers refer to a non-existent?  Of course they cannot: they can only pretend to 
refer. But if they want to teach the m yth as a true story they can, and even need to share their 
                                                 
6 The boundary between those two categories may fluctuate from one philosopher to another. An extreme case is 
that of t he advocates of genuine “non-existent objects”: they reduce t he class of genui nely vacuous si ngular 
terms to the empty class. 
7 As a proponent of a maximally liberal ontology, Zalta rightly insists on this point: “Once we are able to see that 
all significant proper names are names of object s, we m ay simplify the Tarski-style definition of t ruth for 
languages in which names of nonexistents appear along with nam es of existents. The truth conditions m ay be 
specified more systematically, since no special precautions need to be take n to distinguish the two kinds of 
names”. (Zalta 1984: 2) (In return, his support for MR forces him  to acc ount for a general “m etaphysics of 
object”, including nonexistents.) 
8 Moreover, MR leads to the counterin tuitive upshot that histori cal discoveries – e.g. som e confirmation of the 
conjecture that Homer never existed – amount to some semantic change. 
9 This contradicts our pre-theoretical notion of linguistic meaning; cf. Evans (1982: 23-24). 
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child’s belief object, namely the semantic value he or she assigns to the m ythical name. In 
other word, whenever veraciously speaking about  “Santa Claus”, in a fictional or serious 
manner, one needs to postulate a genuine semantic (if not ontological) correlate for that name. 
Fictionally or seriously (believed) uses of  singular term s and their related speech acts, 
pretended or genuine reference, need not and cannot penetrate into sem antics. As Recanati 
puts it, “the difference does not m atter from a strictly linguistic point of view. For we use the 
same linguistic m aterial, with the sam e linguistic meaning, whether we genuinely refer or 
only pretend to refer. This follows from the very notion of ‘pretense’.” (1996: 467). 
Incidentally, our criticism  of the standard processing of empty proper nam es expands to 
usual theories f or the sem antics of fiction:10 free logics (Lam bert 2003) as well as 
substitutional accounts of quantification (Kripke  1976) rely on the a priori and ad hoc 
definition of a class of specific proper names (constants to which no existential generalization 
apply for free logics, substitutional terms for substitutional quantification), that entails a loss 
of uniformity in the semantic analysis of proper names.  
 
3. Beyond (first-order) formalized languages 
Where does model-realism come from? It seems to be straightforwardly im plied by a strict 
application of Quine’s ontological com mitment criterion to m odel-theory: if a sentence 
consists in an existentially quantif ied formula true in a given structure, then the value of the 
quantified variable m aking the sentence tr ue must be acknowledged into the ontology. 
However, such an application lacks a justif ication. Should one take it for granted that 
quantifiers behave the sam e way in every possi ble context where m odel-theory applies? It 
appears not to be the case. Like Frege, Quine stic ks to some very restrictive class of uses of 
language: that of genuine descriptive se ntences, and his criterion depends on the 
regimentation of such sentences into an adequate logical language. 11 Of course, m any 
language-games do not fit with Quine’s favorite one. 
3.1. Taking context into account 
Strawson (1950) challenged Russell’s (1905) standard  analysis of descriptions. In the norm al 
use of definite description we generally invoke incomplete descriptions, like “the table”, and 
so we achieve referring to individual objects. However, there is not a unique table in the 
universe, and according to the Russellian constr ual the description “the table” should then 
miss its goal. It is incomplete in the sense where in order to denote an individual successfully, 
she should be completed like “the table of this room” (with an indexical) or like “the table of 
Russell’s kitchen” (without indexical).  
Different strategies have been followed to avoid this failure of Russell’s theory (see Reimer 
1998). One of them, favored by lots of semanticists, consist in saying that the interpretation of 
an incomplete description is m ade possible as  soon as one considers the description in its 
context of utterance: the context play a role in  restricting the domain of relevant objects. For 
instance, interpreting “the table” is m ade possible uttered in a room , so that the context will 
implicitly restrict the course of  values to the objects of  the room. In some other contexts, for 
example if we were speaking about Russell’s kitchen, the domain would be constrained by the 
                                                 
10 See Rahman 2009 for an overview and a recent account in the semantics of fiction 
11 In some sense, we could say that since the translation into first-order logic of natural-language sentences is not 
expected to reach synonymy, Quine’s criterion should not be expected to account for the m eaning of natural-
language quantifiers. 
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discourse preceding the utterance of the descrip tion in question, so that it would be naturally 
interpreted as denoting the table of Russell’s kitchen.  
Actually, such an analysis does the job not only for definite descriptions but also for other 
quantified expressions. For exam ple, when a speaker asserts to an audience “Everybody’s 
tired now”, this is not (in general) an asse rtion about everybody existing in the universe, but 
about the relevant people who are the other pe ople of the audience. Here too, the context 
plays a crucial role restricting the dom ain of interpretation of the quantif iers. Nevertheless, 
this is not the exclusive role of context re garding natural language quantifiers: context is 
required to disam biguate generalized quan tifiers between collective and distributive 
interpretations (see Hofweber 2000), e.g. between 
“Four philosophers carried three pianos” 
and 
“Four philosophers carried three books” 
where the usual interpretation of “three” (either three for each philosopher, or three for all) 
depends on the things to be carried.  
The key role of context in natural language is thus not only due to the m assive use of 
indexicals or of underspecified expressions. Frege’s purpose of a Begriffschrift without 
ambiguous symbols, as well as Quine’s intention to use only eternal sentences, could reach a 
situation where semantics is made context-independent. Nonetheless, as the above-mentioned 
cases indicate this is not sufficient to get rid of the issue: context plays a pervasive role in the 
interpretation of natural language quantifiers. 
The linguistic situations on which Quine built his criterion appear to be very restrictive and 
artificial. Like Frege and Russell, he restricted  himself to cases where context plays no role, 
hence to cases where language can be considered as a pure device well-shaped to describe the 
world. These are the typical cases where the repr esentational view of semantics can arise, in 
accordance with a universalistic conception of logic and language. By contrast, the way 
people use natural language in general, and quantifiers in particular, is context-dependent. The 
procedural view of sem antics is thus quite na tural as soon as one is interested in the way 
people speak and understand language in real situ ations. As we will now show, quantifiers in 
such a perspective cannot be linked to ontological com mitment as they are according to the 
representational view. Indeed, members of TSO are viewed as mere semantic artifacts, and no 
more as bona fide objects. 
3.2. Anaphora, skolemization, and quantification 
The so-called dynamic turn in Natural Language (NL) sem antics happened during the 1980s, 
as a response to the difficulties raised by phenomena like anaphora. Indeed, anaphoric 
pronouns – i.e. pronouns “co-referring” in som e sense with an antecedent expression (proper 
name, definite or indefinite description) – cannot  be fully analyzed within first-order logic. 
Several reasons explain that fact, among which the following two ones: 
(i) Anaphora can be inter-sentential, wher eas variables are not linked beyond one single 
sentence; moreover, in many other cases logical dependence appears to be at odds with 
syntactic scopes, as is shown through skolemization; 
(ii) Anaphora involves information flow, beyond and above purely semantic information. 
Inter-sentential linking can be shown th rough many obvious exam ples where a pronoun 
refers to an individual introduced in a preceding sentence, like in e.g.  
“A man eats pretzels. He choked with them.”  
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Some of the sim plest cases like this one coul d be processed using usual first-order logic 
with wide-scope quantifiers, so that the pr onouns (formalized by variables) of the second 
sentence be bound by the quantifiers of the first sentence. However, this method could hardly 
be expanded to a one-page discourse, and it does not work in the general case.  
Indeed, several theories resort to choice and Skolem functions to account for indefinites or 
anaphoric pronouns. Such functions m ap non-empty sets onto one of their elem ents, possibly 
taking into account one or several objects of th e current domain. Whatever be the technical 
implementation, what is to be noticed here is th at such functions are required to process wide 
scope (Reinhart 1997) as well as narrow scope  indefinites (Schlenker 2006, W inter 2004). In 
the example just above, a (constant) function f would be introduced while processing “ a 
man”, which could be used again to process “he” in the second sentence. To consider another, 
more interesting example, in order to account for the sentence:  
“Every man loves a (certain) woman – his mother”  
the following formalization is employed: 
∃f [SK(f) ∧ ∀x [man(x) → love(x, f(x,woman))]] 
The principle benefit of such a formalization is that it enables one to make further anaphoric 
reference to the selected individual, which would not be the case using a standard FO formula 
like the following one: 
∀x ∃y [man(x) → (woman(y) ∧ love(x, y))] 
where the scope of the existential quantifier (∃y) cannot go beyond the matrix of the formula. 
Yet, since such formalizations require functional quantification, shall we consider that our NL 
quantifiers hide second-order quantification?  We do not believe so. The entities quantified 
over in the previous example are usual individuals – so what? 
That puzzling situation is due to the f act that NL quantifiers do not just encode sem antic 
information, but also involve a proper dynam ic component frequently labeled information 
flow. Actually such a com ponent is already pr esent in first-order quantifiers. Hintikka 
(e.g. 1997) constantly criticizes Frege for his short-sighted conception of quantifiers as 
second-order predicates. According to him , Frege missed the point: quantifiers do not only 
pick out individuals from  a domain, they do it in  conformity with certain patterns of  mutual 
dependence. For instance, when an existential quantifier (∃y) is in the scope of a universal one 
(∀x), its value will depend on the choice of a value for x.  
As it seems, natural language uses many patterns of dependence and independence between 
quantifiers, and some of these patterns cannot be formalized within standard first-order logic. 
This fact basically explains the success of Skolem  functions in NL semantics, as well as that 
of other theories conceiving quantifier scopes as more liberated than in their classical 
understanding.12 
3.3. Presupposition 
One of the most popular theories in NL semantics since the 1980s is Hans Kam p’s Discourse 
Representation Theory (DRT) (see Kam p 1981, Kam p & Reyle 1993). It provides an 
interesting insight onto sem antic issues and their connections with ontology. DRT is a two-
step semantic theory. The f irst step consists in the construction of Discourse Representation 
Structures (DRSs) which constitute the specif ic level of  the theory. This is the place where 
anaphora resolution is handled. The second step  is a m ore standard one, that of m odel-
                                                 
12 Let us mention branching quantifiers (Barwise 1979), Game-Theoretical Semantics and IF logic (Hintikka & 
Sandu 1997), Dynamic Predicate Logic (Groenendijk & Stokhof 1991). 
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theoretic interpretation: it connects DRSs to standard model-theory. One can choose either an 
extensional interpretation structure or an intensional one based on possible worlds. 
During the first step, DRT thus adds  to the m odel-theoretic floor a representational level 
made of the DRSs. This supplementary level regiments some contextual information, e.g. the 
order of sentences, that does not appear in th e model-theoretic evaluation of discourses. A 
DRS K is an ordered pair nU, Co composed of a universe U, i.e. a set of representatives 
(discourse referents, or reference markers), and of a set C of conditions, namely the 
properties and relations ascribed to referen ce markers. During the discourse interpretation, 
discourse referents can be added to the uni verse independently of the presence of a 
corresponding entity in the dom ain of the interp retation model. Hence unlike other theories, 
DRT does not process the anaphoric relati on as if it were a genuine co-reference 
phenomenon: the ontological neutrality of DRSs allows accounting for anaphoric relations 
even in cases where there is a lack of reference. 
More: as it processes every singular term, DRT system atically introduces a discourse 
referent into the universe of the corresponding DRS. In other words, the denotation of singular 
terms is automatically presupposed to exist. For instance, because  most of the usual definite 
descriptions are incomplete, they are treated like anaphoric expressions: an antecedent is thus 
expected in the context of the utterance, i.e. a reference marker available from the DRS, so that 
the marker of the description can be identif ied with it. W hat does happen if no m arker was 
previously introduced? As the descripti on cannot be resolved, a m echanism of 
accommodation adequately extends the discourse context with a marker that can play the role 
of the antecedent (Beaver 1997: 976, 989-990). Th is mechanism therefore induces context-
shifts in order to allow updates of DRSs so that the discourse process can go on. If a m arker is 
introduced by accommodation, it can nevertheless be later cancelled by some revision, such as 
in the following dialogue: 
A. “Santa Claus is coming.” 
B. “No, he doesn’t exist!” 
Those pragmatic mechanisms of accommodation and cancellation appear to be unavoidable to 
account for the sem antics of discourses. As Pe regrin puts it: “For the sem antics to become 
really dynamic, we m ust turn denotations not only into ‘context-consum ers,’ but also into 
‘context-producers’ – so that an utterance might consume a context produced by a preceding 
one.” (Peregrin 2000). According to Groenendijk and Stokhof, this is even one of the m ain 
characteristics of the dynam ic turn: “W hat is new, is the focus on context change: 
interpretation not only depends on the context, but also creates context” (Groenendijk and 
Stokhof 1999: 6). 
The resort to DRT can be m isleading and sugge st that, as this theory stipulates an 
intermediate representative level between language and models, dynamic semantics requires a 
conceptualist or mentalist construal of sem antical interpretation. Semantics and logic would 
then collapse into psychology. Fortunately, th ere is nothing of the sort. DRT discourse 
referents are not to be thought of as “m ental entities”: they are neither more nor less than the 
functional role they play in the theory, nam ely the role of antecedents in anaphoric processes; 
since anaphoric processes are fundam entally inferential processes, discourse referents are 
determined by their inferential role. 
Can such considerations be transposed to m odel-theoretic individuals? It might be objected 
that if one goes back to the evaluation of DRSs (i.e. to the second step of DRT), standard 
semantics will take over so that e.g. the discour se referent connected with “Cinderella” have 
no semantic value. Nevertheless, the exam ple checked in this section indicate that two 
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important features of DRT – the decoupling between the procedural and representational 
components of meaning, and the determ ination of the “referents” by thei r functional role in 
the evaluation theory – m ight be not specific to this very fram ework but that they could be 
characteristic of dynamic (procedural) semantics in general.13  
3.4. Understanding, Phenomenology and Internal Truth 
Other analyses suggest a sim ilar sharp distinc tion between two levels. This is the case of 
Hofweber’s (2000) conception of NL quantifiers . According to Hofweber, a separation is to 
be made between the internal reading or inferential role reading  of quantifiers, and their 
external reading or domain conditions reading . The first case naturally occurs in sentences 
conveying partial inform ation, like in “ There is someone Fred admires very much ”, when 
Fred’s attitude can be directed towards Sher lock Holmes, whereas the second case is obvious 
in “There is something to drink in the fridge .” Like for DRT, it seem s that linguistic 
understanding in concrete contexts only requires a neutral, procedural view of quantifiers, 
while the ontologically committing interpretation is put aside for very specific situations. How 
are we to interpret such inferential levels?  
Several (maybe conflicting) interpretations of DRSs can be given. Asher (1993: 64) mentions 
three of them: logical form, partial model and mental representation. As we just said, the latter 
interpretation is escapable. Asher himself conceives of DRSs as homomorphic to the structure 
of mental states, i.e. as partial representations of the cognitive structure conveyed by the 
interpretation of a discourse. A m inimal interpretation of the DRT form alism would view 
DRSs as mere syntactic objects. According to such a view, DRT does not provide an extension 
of FOL in the usual sense: there is no real in crease of the expressive  power of the language 
that would uncover some new features of the model-theoretic structure.  
In any case, the principal goal of DRT remains accounting for anaphora resolution and some 
inferences can be handled at the proper level of DRSs, sparing us a detour by way of FOL (see 
Cooper et al. 1994: 54 sq). Of course it does not su ffice to qualify DRT as a non-syntactic 
theory, but it nevertheless gives its repr esentational level a sem antic flavor. DRSs must be 
conceived of as encoding the interpretation pro cess of discourse that m akes further semantic 
interpretation possible. 
Discourse interpretation can be carried out w ithout any confrontation with reality, i.e. 
without any sem antic evaluation. Except in th e case of underspecification, the process of 
construction of DRSs is alm ost completely independent from that of evaluation. Such a 
semantic restraint is of course assum ed for anaphora resolution, since an anaphoric link m ust 
be solved before any semantic evaluation. Besides, it has other advantages, such as providing 
a non-trivial interpretation of discourse about non- existent entities or resolving contradictions 
at the level of representations without a total collapse. 
An immediate upshot is a possibl e account of truth at the interm ediate level. It is a local, 
internal truth, viewed as an another name for the consistency of the DRSs. 
Even though one need not endorse a m entalist reading of DRSs (or of any other theoretical 
entity used to account for the procedural feature of meaning), it should be noticed that the way 
DRT processes language and presupposition is not  far from phenomenological “bracketing”. 
                                                 
13 This seems to be Peregrin’s viewpoint, when he ar gues for a general reduction of “reference” to “inference” 
via “co-reference”: “If we recognize individuaries [sets of indi viduals contextually introduced by dynam ic 
semantics] and their inhabitants as mere tools to account for inferences, then the talk about reference becomes 
essentially parasitic upon the talk of inference – a referent is nothing more than an illustrious clamp holding 
certain inferentially related expressions together.” (Peregrin 2000) 
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In some sense, dynam ic semantics provides a picture of the way people reach an internal 
perspective onto the world through discourse interpretation. 
4. Towards a neutral semantics 
As was seen in the last section, several NL phenomena show to be irreducible to a m ere 
analysis within first-order logic, i.e. within the locus naturalis of Quine’s criterion. Semantic 
analysis requires a procedural approach as a first step, corresponding to the way people 
interpret or understand NL utterances, before any possible more classical and ontologically 
committing account, connecting interpreted langua ge to world. The ontologically-neutral 
conception of semantics put forward in the pr eceding section allows many choices forbidden 
to model-realists so that our (procedural) theories suitably account for our linguistic intuitions. 
According to such a neutral view, procedur al semantics only targets m odeling linguistic 
meaning, whatever the world may be. Expressed in the Quinian idiom: the neutral view leads 
to a naturalization of semantics, and to an anti-revisionist strategy.  
Focusing on the cognitive value of  any usual proper nam e (empty or not), a naturalized 
conception of sem antics will naturally favor some uniform analysis and account for the 
aforementioned case of “Santa Claus” in a child’s way. With this broad (ontologically) neutral 
view, what is expected from theories is a meaningful account of the contribution of contextual 
domains of discourse to the sem antics of se ntences: ontological considerations about the 
status of dom ains are beyond their subject m atter. If a theory targets a true description of 
linguistic meaning, whatever the ontology, it needs no artificial (m etaphysical) meta-
theoretical constraints on the constitution of TSO: neutral semantics is hence characterized by 
a kind of meta-theoretical freedom. 
TSO variability (“ontological relativity”), as it is induced by m odel theory, needs not be 
restricted. Defined as relative to a structure, the Tarskian concept of truth should not be 
thought of as the universalistic, absolute one. No r should one consider such and such TSO as 
composed of bona fide objects. MR appears thus to be a coarse transposition of the 
universalistic outlook to a frame where it becomes senseless. 
We can now sum up the results of the first part of this paper, in a few points: 
(i) Semantic values, including truth, can be c onceived of either in a procedural way, as 
internal to the interpretation level of  discourse, or in a representational or referential m anner, 
as resulting to some relationship between language and the external word; 
(ii) Internal semantic values, including internal truth, are sufficient to account for linguistic 
understanding; they are disconnected from any ontological commitment; 
(iii) Quine’s criterion m ay be relevant as f ar as we are concerned with representational 
semantics, but not at all when considering procedural semantics, i.e. the interpretation level of 
language. 
The intermediate conclusion reached so far is the lack of general entailm ent between truth 
and ontological com mitment. However, for fiction it m eans that we avoid com mitment to 
fictional objects just acknowledging a kind of internal (procedural) truth. In the second part of 
the paper, we will claim  that fiction can also be true in a strong, external sense. Of course, it 
cannot be done using representational semantics – if it were done that way, one would have to 
restore Quine’s criterion and ultim ately admit of fictional objects. W e will def end that the 
connection between fiction and the external worl d is not a kind of representation, but another 
one; and since fiction is, in some sense, indispensable, it can be considered as genuinely true. 
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Part 2. TRUTH FORM INDISPENSABILITY 
In this section, we will rely on the Indispensab ility Argument in order to argue in favor of the 
utility of fictions which implies then that f ictions are true. The issue is thus no m ore that of 
truth within fiction, but that of the truth of fiction. The underlying idea is that fictional 
narrations do an interpretative use of language, and not a descriptive use; by this way, they 
could avoid being the matter of theoretical condemnations.  
We will exploit literary criticism  and philo sophy of art to support the dem onstration. 
Moreover, we chose to focus on novels and thoughts of novelists 14 since they are a good 
illustration for our purpose. Af ter trying to speci fy the indispensability of  fictions, we will 
secondly precise which kind of truths they seem to express.  
1. The “Indispensability Argument” and its revision 
Historically, the so-called argum ent has been developed by Quine (1948, 1976, 1981) and 
Putnam (1979a, b) as a contribution within  the philosophy of m athematics. Because 
mathematical theories take a central place in ev ery branch of empirical science, philosophers 
began to argue that they are indispensable in th at sense, and furtherm ore, that this kind of 
indispensability, according to the line of the argument, gives us good reasons to believe in the 
existence of mathematical entities. In other word s, we can use this strategy to reinf orce the 
thesis of mathematical realism: “reference to (and quantification over) mathematical entities 
such as sets, numbers, functions and such, summaries M. Colyvan (2008), is indispensable to 
our best scientific theories, and so we ought  to be com mitted to the existence of this 
mathematical entities”. Of  course, many other forms of the Indispensability Argum ent have 
emerged since then, and precisions as m uch as adjustments have been proposed, especially 
concerning the way we have to understand the m eaning of this indispensability. W e will not 
rejoin the debates about the classical version of  the argument. Let us just try to exam ine how 
it can fit to the case of aesthetic fictions. 
First of all, our interest is not oriented to the defense of fictional entities, since we argued in 
part 1 that no ontological commitment necessarily results from the truth of fictional discourse. 
Then we must cut of f the inference from indispensability to the existence of  the entities in 
question. What is left is the very idea of indi spensability. But here again, it is quite im portant 
to notify that fictions are not essentially determined by an hypothetical, even successful, 
applicability to em pirical sciences, neither by any kind of  pure descriptive or explanatory 
functions. Therefore, the weakening revision of the argument is operated in order to dism iss 
the original link between being indi spensable, and being indispensable to our best scientific 
theories, which means to renounce to the idea of a theoretical indispensability.15 The reason is 
the distinction we assum e between two uses of  language: the descriptive use, im plied by the 
classical form of the argument, and an intentional use, expressed in all discourse participating 
of our practical apprehension of the meaning of events or behaviors.16 This contrast allows us 
                                                 
14 The term “novel” must be t aken in its common meaning. In part icular, that is to say we don’t  assume the 
distinction by N. Frye (1957) between “novel” and “novelist”. 
15 It could be viewed as a general ization and an extension of Quine’s holism beyond its original boundaries, as 
was suggested to us by J. Morizot. 
16 It is worth noticing that like in Part 1, we want to ground truth into interpretation. Here, the question is that of 
the interpretation of people, actions, etc. ; by contrast, in Part 1 the issue was that of linguistic interpretation. 
What is common between the two cases is the objective to account for truth without description, hence without 
ontological commitment. 
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to think that fictions are rather based on the latter, since they do not seriously describe the 
world. So, they are not stricto sensu indispensable to our best scientific theories, but to our 
best understanding of the signification of life.  In what follows, we are trying to grasp 
something like the practical hermeneutical weighting of fictions. 
Besides the ontological reading of  the Indispensability Argument, there is another one. In 
fact, if we adm it that m athematics, or now f ictions, are indispensable in any sense, then 
mathematical or fictional discourse must be considered as true. It seems hard to deny the truth 
of mathematical theories in re gards of their em pirical success; then it would seem  hard to 
deny the truth of fictions in regards of their pr actical success. But this is quite odd! At first 
blush, fictions are qualified as false, wrong, even malicious, and literally defined as non-
serious discourses, for the very reason that it is fictional . Consequently, our goal is first to 
give an account of the specific indispensability of  fictions, and secondly to modify, at least to 
justify, the idea that fictions tell us som e true things about the world and human beings – we 
will try to make clear which kind of truth it is. 
One last point before entering the dem onstration: contrary to m athematics, fictions are not 
in themselves a priori indispensable, in the sense that they  are not created in order to explain 
the reality, describe what there is or im prove our knowledge about the world. 17 They are not 
produced to be scientifically, em pirically or theoretically useful. Thus we could say that 
fictions are not indispensable, but it is yet i ndispensable to have fictions: once it has been 
written or film ed, once there are fictions, a nd even if each fiction separately is not 
indispensable, we must observe how m uch it can help us to interpret and understand som e 
features of the world and of human attitudes.18 In that sense, we will try to defend that fictions 
are a posteriori indispensable for the reason that using this kind of tool im proves our general 
and intentional capture of life. 
 
2. Being indispensable is equivalent to being useful and non-reducible. 
“I’ve read a lot and I do understand what’s the point” 
R. Gary, Les racines du ciel. 
Fictions are usually thought as being useless: telling stories would alm ost be the sam e as 
telling foolishnesses. This point of view can be met both in everyday-life and in philosophy, 
as it is som etimes implied by som e logical i nvestigations, moral considerations or even 
aesthetics thesis. All happens as if there was a sort of common agreement about the idea that 
fictions, because they are literally fictional, are non-serious illusionary discourses, and 
consequently, neither indispensable nor true. Recall the condemnation by Plato in Republic (X 
605d-606c), by Furetière (1666) in the XVIIth century in France, by Frege and Russell 
claiming that all fictional sentences are never true 19. In fact, this kind of allegiance seem s to 
be the current beginning for all philosophical anal ysis of the status of fictional narrations. 
More recently, P. Lam arque and S.H. Olsen (1994)  have also argued in favor of the contra-
                                                 
17 We could nuance this claim  by distinguishing between fiction and myth: the latter might have been initially 
considered as a story which was created in order to explain the origins of the world. But it was still a sym bolic 
description rather than a theoretical one. 
18 It is clo se to the thesis of aesthetic cognitivism in its epistemic way – distinct from its aesthetic way. See 
Darsel, S. & Pouivet, R. (2008). 
19 More accurately, fictional propositions are considered as  always false by Russell, and without any truth-value 
by Frege. 
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truth tendency about literature, but they defend at the sam e time a humanistic conception of 
fictions, which recognize their indispensability20.  
On the other side of extrem e speeches, as  Bouveresse outlines (2008:13), we encounter 
some mystical defenses which laud the superiority  of the fiction within the magical quest for 
Truth. Here, only pieces of art and literature (or poetry) can reach the very deep and essential 
truth of Life, and it goes until the claim  that f ictions are the truth itself . We will not argue 
against this faith, for it is quite excessive and far from being rigorously argued. 
In order to contest the utility of fictions, pe ople and philosophers actually adopt a scientific 
outlook, assuming by this way that fictions use the descriptive function of language. If they 
would really be written in a descriptive sigh ting, then nothing will distinguish them  from 
science or philosophy, and at worst, they m ight be judged as elim inable. In particular, the 
explanatory mission of realist and naturalist novels from the XIXth century, Balzac’s or 
Zola’s ones for instance, and their presumption to be objective and impartial, could be thought 
as directly challenging the goals and m ethods of empirical sciences. In this case, the utility 
would be quite relative, since we m ay wonder why then these novelists choose a fictional 
treatment  for some questions which receive a best analysis if studied by hum an sciences like 
philosophy, or nowadays psychology. The com petencies, abilities and efficacy of fictions, in 
comparison with serious theorizations, seem to suffer the very choice of the narrative way. 
The problem stands in the confusion between the two uses of language. W hen we say that 
novels describe some features of the world and human hearts, we m ust not strictly take the 
term “description” in its scientific and refere ntial meaning. Fictions do not describe anything 
in this m anner; actually, fictions are always a medium for interpretations. In other words, 
those who claim that fictions are useless, in fact look after a pure descriptive use of language, 
and then, being disappointed, they discredit all kind of indispensability of them . But if we 
bring to light that fictions express an intentiona l use of language, if we really differentiate the 
serious and the non-serious discourse by this wa y (regarding dissimilarities of methods, ends 
and objects), then we are apt to show in wh ich sense non-serious non-descriptive narrations 
are indispensable. 
Before demonstrating this point, it is rather important to precise one last thing. Som eone 
could object us that we are making an instrumental use of literary creations. This is obviously 
not the case. Outlining their possible utility is not the sam e as reducing them to their practical 
helpfulness. Indeed, fictions do have m any other aspects and purposes, like precisely being 
absolutely not created in order to be useful, or used, like being just aesthetic products. Then 
we give our attention to their indispensability only in the context of the debate concerning the 
truth (or falsehood) of fictions. 
2.1. Utility of fictions 
We precise at once the kind of  utility we argue f or, i.e. a practical utility. Certainly, f ictional 
creations do also have m any other utilities: accord ing to different authors, they can console 
our grieves, they can answer to some primitive needs, they can incite us to social revolts, they 
can purify our souls, and so on. But here, the idea is that fictions, and novels in particular, are 
useful for our apprehension of life.21 So, the reasons why novel is practically useful – in order 
                                                 
20 Their proper view is to claim that “the concept of truth has no central or ineliminable role in critical pratices”, 
or in others words, that “there is  no significant place for truth as a critical  term applied to works of literature” 
(1994: 1). Lamarque and Olsen are not reticent to th e idea of a specific cognitiv e function of fiction and 
literature, but separate this question from the question of truth. On this point, we might disagree. 
21 This idea echoes wi th W. Benjamin’s study about the function of the “narrator”. See Benjamin (1936): “a 
narration comprises openly or secretly a utility. [...] The narrator is of good advice for her audience”. 
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to understand m ore accurately the real worl d and people – are m ultifaceted. We will now 
make an inventory of  them, mainly due to literary criticism , from the least to the greatest 
specific function. 
(i) Descriptions. Surely, it holds a heuristic value, b ecause it taps and reveals some aspects 
of reality still ignored. It could be considered as a kind of concurrent for the historian, as 
many authors have said. For exam ple, Hugo defines himself as an “historian of custom s and 
ideas”, of “hearts and souls” (1862). Novelists, like J. Austen, M. Yourcenar, H. Jam es, and 
almost all writers would be able to deliver some traits of hum an psychology. Then fictions 
seem to offer knowledge about human beings and reality, operating as a source of information 
which are not found elsewhere. But, as we have said before, this way of speaking is a kind of 
“naïve” view: it is not a word-to-word vision of  the utility of  narrations, and it is not at all 
their very specificity; again, fictions are useful to interpret the world. 
(ii) Spreading. Novel conveys and broadcasts som e scientific, philosophical or m oral 
knowledge, like so-called Lucretius’ or Boileau’s didactic poems, or like La Fontaine’s tales. 
Its value here is then didactic, but once again, not characteristic. 
  
(iii) Abilities. Novels can expand and im prove our mental faculties (intellectual and 
sensible), and particularly our m odal competencies, as following R. Pouivet (2008), just by 
telling and listening to stories. This is one of the ideas developed within the aesthetic 
cognitivism thesis. Here, its value is cognitive, but once again, not characteristic. 
(iv) Distance. Novel questions and shakes som e dominating viewpoints, offering new 
prolific perspectives about what happened, wh at is hidden under a uniform  social discourse, 
what looks like being established. Its value here is critique, and we can think about polemic or 
provocative stories, or about som e various notions which are turned round – barbarity, with 
Aeschylus, Flaubert or J. M. Coetzee; stupidit y, with G. Grass or I. B. Singer. Once m ore, 
highbrow essays could do the job, but we could – and we will – argue that there is a special 
flavor of fictional criticism. 
(v) Arranging. Some novelists are trying to arrange a nd give a significant structure to all 
kind of facts or knowledges, in order to redu ce the feeling of chaos and gibberish we m ay 
have about the world and the way we speak about  it. For authors want to m ake sense, they 
take over and condense intellectual, social a nd empirical matters, including them in a story 
which seems to be based on encyclopedic designs. Think of R. Musil, H. Broch, J. L. Borges, 
Flaubert and, today, som eone like P. Senges. So me commentators consider that tendency to 
be a taxonomic obsession. Here, the value of the fi ction is rather synthesizing, which is much 
more specific to it because it is meant to interpret the heterogeneousness of the world. 
(vi) Surveys. Novel studies and clarifies in a deep  analysis som e known features of the 
reality, by extending our intentional word list. V. Descombes observes that reading stories 
gives us an “enlightenment of our vocabulary for the description of hum an areas” (1987:16). 
We begin to im prove our consciousness of vari ous aspects of life, those which are not so 
obvious. For instance, m oralists such as La Br uyère, or dram atists such as Corneille or 
Molière, reveal som e dark parts of the functioning of our passions. More generally, 
digressions and meditations within the plot do play this role, as M. Kundera outlines it (1986). 
And the efforts m ade by m any authors to grasp, for instance, the spirit of  a city m ay be 
thought in this perspective (like Vienna seen by T. Bernhard, R. Musil, E. Jelinek...). This is a 
characteristic value of the novel to be analytical, and being as such, to be pedagogical. In fact, 
it educates our perception, offering us the possi bility to becom e more attentive to som e 
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ordinary things. I. Calvino defines for exam ple his book Palomar as being a “pedagogy of 
look and of thought” (1985).  
(vii) Readings. Finally, last but not least, novel is a creator of significance. It suggests 
different interpretations of hum an behaviors and social phenom ena, developing different 
decoding frames of the world. Polyphonic novels illustrate it very well, like A. Kristof’s 
trilogy, L. Durrell’s Quatuor, or J. Barnes’s Talking it over: intertwining of viewpoints allow 
the reader to m ultiply the meaning of the stor y, and consequently, of  life. Moreover, some 
novels are bound on som e sort of metaphysical hypothesis, in the trivial sense; they are then 
apt to help us to have one of the possible understandings of the meaning of reality. Following 
Kafka, Dostoïevski or Beckett, we are invited to  read the world in light of  its absurdity, its 
tragicomic side. Its value is therefore hermeneutical. 
In brief, (vi) and (vii) are the central c ontribution we claim  fictions do provide. It 
characterizes the very specificity of the utility in question. Furthermore, (iii), (iv) and (v) may 
be considered as m odalities, means or even resu lts of this particular utility. The m ark (i) is 
controversial, depending to what we m ean by “description”, and (ii) is quite contingent, 
exemplified by many novels, but not only by them . The entire inventory leads us to assert 
that, pace Plato and Quine, fictions are undoubtedly useful. 
2.2. Non-reducibility of fictions 
The indispensability of  fictions has actually to be def ined by two f eatures: to be usef ul to 
understand the world and the hum an existence, and to be non-reducible to other expressive 
media. We do need to give an account of the very  specificity of the practical role of fictions. 
The fact that fictions are indispensable m eans then that they are necessary in order for us to 
have a better understanding of the world. So, the validity of the argument supposes the idea of 
a success implied by the account of fictions with in our hermeneutical apprehension, a kind of 
superior efficacy, which can not be found anywhere else. This is why we have to specify their 
indispensability, in order to dismiss their possible contingency and eliminability. 
Novels are irreducible if and only if we ar e successful in dem onstrating that we cannot 
paraphrase their content into another form ulation, because it would im ply that we can 
eliminate the fictional turn in favor of a theore tical, or at least descriptive, use of language. 
The possibility of being dispensable definitely  asks for a possibility of translation, as a 
canonical logical notation is supposed to provide . The point is that, even if it looks like 
possible to reduce some fictional propositions at a local level, it still rem ains hard to apply it 
at a global level. The teaching lesson we could ex tract from a story does not express at all the 
whole hermeneutical process in progress. Why is it so? Six features can be sketched out. 
(i) Complexity. As Kundera claim s, “the spirit of the novel is the spirit of the 
complexity”(1986:30). According to him , the “eter nal truth of the novel” is to say to the 
reader that “things are m uch more complicated than you think”. Moreover, Kundera 
emphasizes that the particularity of the hermeneutical utility of fictions has to struggle against 
the tendency to standardization: “the novel is al so [like the world] wo rried by the termites of 
the reduction, which do not only reduce the meaning of the world, but also the meaning of the 
oeuvre”. What is crucial is then to take into account and save this pluri-interpretability. 
It goes together with the ironic, hum oristic and playful dimension of the novel, which is at 
the same time a dim ension of the offered understanding. It pushes away and question our 
theoretical grasping of real events. Furtherm ore, because fictions enjoy the privilege of an 
entire freedom of treatments for serious them es, authors are allowed to draw aside rational 
norms, scientific requirements or reasonable viewpoints in order to create stim ulating echoes 
of signification. According to D. Rozakis, novels are attached to the praxis, and the function 
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of imagination is to show that there is no strai ght a priori rule to know if som e principles are 
controversial, neither when nor how (2009: 18). So, contrary to the theoretical sphere, and 
then to the descriptive use of language, the fi ctional use assumes partly paradoxes and their 
evocative power. 
(ii) Non-actuality. Novelists are looking for significations beyond what actually exists or 
happens. For instance, the way R. Musil presents some facts in The Man without qualities  
indicates that the bundle of possible m eanings of one event, such as it could have happened, 
or even such as it should have happened, is m uch more important for our apprehension of the 
deep meaning of things than the event itself . The idea is to dism iss the privilege of  a literal 
one-dimensional viewpoint on actual reality. D. Ro zakis claims also that “the interrogation 
about human businesses requires the fiction, which is not the description of existing custom s, 
but the quest of a future good”  (2009:15). The entire axiological dim ension of fictions is 
linked to this deviation from the current data. 
 (iii) Symbolizations. Fictions are generally based on the use of sym bols and metaphors. 
The specificity of these non-literal expressions is to have m any possible interpretations, at 
least several variable ones. The novel is the ar t of detail: its irreducibility com es from this 
evocative brightness of concrete things, consider ed at first blush as trifling insignificant dust. 
And sometimes, in this perspective, we will be urged to read the story of  one m an as a 
relevant mirror of the general human life. The process is therefore much more analogical than 
logical (in the trivial sense) or explicative, because the m eaning stands in em blems and 
pictures, rather than in formal argumentative systems.  
(iv) Content-form dependency: local level. There is a necessary inseparability between 
what is written and how it is written, between what the story tells us and how it tells it. This is 
the reason for choosing the narrative way rather  than the theoretical descriptive one. V. 
Descombes notices that an idea becom es really novelistic “when the writer found a way to 
‘analyze’ it, i.e. to change it into a schem atic scenario” (1987:90). The point is that the 
specificity of fictions results from  a narra tive analysis of called up concepts, ideas or 
questions, like for example the degradation of values in Broch’s famous book, or the adultery 
in Anna Karenina.  Therefore, this will be through the st ory that the reader is going to follow 
gradations, developments and contents of one or  many (theoretic) thoughts. In this sense, it is 
difficult to think we can strictly paraphrase wh at the fiction says, and then im possible to 
reduce its structural aspect which is what is us eful to understand the reactions or choices of a 
character – and, by extension, of a hum an being. It is involved by a kind of heterogeneous 
dynamic impulse. J. Rivière (1913) distinguishes the poetical emotion from the novelistic one, 
precisely because the latter ensues this chronological movement: we progressively 
understand, neither instantaneously nor directly; and the content is not fixed but changing.   
As a consequence, fictions allow us to test the full meaning of some concepts, by means of 
putting them into a plot, or incarnating them  into a character. The idea is that an a priori 
theoretical treatment of them  would not disclo se many features of these concepts, like for 
example practical effects they could have in our “real” existence. In another words, the “veil” 
of imagination plays the role of  an intentional adjuvant which prevents f rom (1) the 
paraphrase by a docum entary or a system atic theory, and (2) the possibility f or the fictional 
discourse to be a descriptive one, even if it can integrate various descriptions. Thanks to this 
specificity, what seem s to be descriptive and th en eliminable, is in reality m ingled into an 
intentional and aesthetic frame, impossible to separate, and which transf orms the content as a 
contribution for the apprehension of  the world. The slogan m ight be: For each different 
expressions, different interpretations of the signification of some ideas . In general, a movie, a 
comic strip, a cartoon, a novel do not assign the same practical lights on us. 
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(v)  Content-form dependency: global level. The work of representation itself seem s to 
endorse significations.22 We might think that the indirect im itative process possesses in itself  
an hermeneutical value, for it structurally organizes words and our world. The spirit of 
nomenclature OuLiPo’s writers display is a m atter for the idea that form al properties, even 
arbitrary chosen, perm it us to read the reality  through different angles, and then to offer 
different intentional hypothesis. Sim ilarly, the stylistic and poetic aspect of fictional 
discourse, playing with rhythm s and sonorities, also involves a kind of intentional 
apprehension which is far from  being subject to paraphrase. How could one rightly elim inate 
the musicality of a tale? 
It is close to Goodman’s idea, according to which “understanding and creation go together” 
(1978). Next J. Morizot (2008), it m eans that (1) contem plating an artwork or following 
artist’s intentions does not exhaust what ha s to be understood about the artwork, and (2) 
creation is the m ost fruitful form  of unders tanding because it has to father first its own 
conditions of relevance, and then to give to them  a form  which can be com municated and 
shared. The same for fictions. Neither interpretations of a myth or multiple readings of a story 
do certainly exhaust their respective m eaning, nor does the m eaning of som e extracted 
concepts. Furthermore, the creative construction of a plot and various characters is also a 
moment of fathering relevant conditions, i.e. giving a consistency to the narration, as well as a 
moment of an intimate understanding of what is involved in. 
(vi) Incompleteness. Finally, novels are like open fram es. They produce a sort of 
fragmented meaning, unfinished, intermittent and out of systematization. This is one of the 
reasons which explains why the question of th e reception and the job of the reader are so 
important. In other words, fictional contents  can not be reduced to positive fixed knowledge, 
because fictional statements are always incomplete, expecting an interaction with us. In fact, 
it is incom plete because (1) there are som e questions about a story which are neither 
checkable nor answerable, and (2) there are some hypothetical interpretations which depend 
on the inner and outer context, i.e. the context of the story itself, and the context of the reader. 
Following (1), we m ay say that, contrary to desc riptive discourse which is considered to be 
underdetermined, but can be completed, fictional discourse is undetermined, and then we may 
conclude that it precisely allows us to propose several interpretations. But this m ulti-
interpretability is not only implied by the first sense of incompleteness. Indeed, following (2), 
it looks as if the meaning of present fictional data is in itself interpretable in many ways. 
Of course, it does not mean that we could carelessly interpret, for we ought to keep in m ind 
the line of the text. We just want to say that fictions are like centripetal media: their meanings 
are impossible to reduce, alike the m eaning of the reality, and their open dim ension gives 
right to Calvino when he wrote that novels are more clever than novelists! The fact that we 
can again and again interpret one story leads us  to suppose we can do the same for events and 
choices in our real existence. The slogan is: For different interpretations of the fiction, 
improved abilities and different intentional interpretations of human life .23 This m any-
hermeneutics of fictional narrations com es from the variability relative to each reader, ages, 
thematic stresses and so on. In short, we clai m that there is no single interpretation of one 
novel, and that no fiction offers one single interpretation of the world.  
                                                 
22 This is one of the principal reasons why the question of the translation of literary works is very problematic. 
We will not enter this complicated debate here... 
23 We will here distinguish aesthetic fictions from  scientific fictions. The reason is that the form er are persistent 
because they are overall content-form dependant, whereas the latter are d eciduous and close; they do not adm it 
different interpretations as much as fictional hypotheses do. 
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Once again, argum entation goes from  the least to  the greatest specificity of the practical 
utility of novels. But each feature contributes to support the idea that fictional discourses 
cannot be elim inated or translated into a pur e descriptive language. And therefore, fictions 
break out as being really indispensable for our grasping of the intentional side of the world. 
2.3. The relation between fiction and reality 
The principal problem that the idea of a practical  utility of fictions presupposes could be that 
we have to accept a necessary relation between fiction and reality. More exactly, the question 
is first “Are fictions linked to the real world? ”, but especially “How? ”, since we com monly 
oppose real and fictional universes. Our thesis  does indeed im ply a porosity between these 
two universes, maintaining at the sam e time a distinction between them . But the f act is that 
we disagree with contrary theses such as th e formalist one, the self -referential dimension 
fictions would have, or Baudelaire’s claim  about the autotelic value of pieces of art or 
literature (1857). In particular, Genette’s idea of  a watertightness of fictional worlds (1991: 
58-60) appears to be quite erroneous, for it w ould imply that novels can not be useful to 
anything but themselves and literary history (see also Macdonald 1954). 
Aesthetic cognitivism does also suppose som e connections between reality and fiction. In 
fact, if we learn from fictions some things about the real world, we will be inclined to assum e 
that this is because of such a link. And even if novelists choose to speak about, not the actual 
reality, but a kind of ideal one – the way things  should happen, instead of the way they really 
happen – it nevertheless does not prevent us to think that this m oral and modal quest stands 
closely to what we may call the true human existence. According to E. Fraisse & B. Mouralis, 
this abstract im agined reality is not less real , because “its advent is considered as being 
possible” (2001: 152). Measures of probability  and credibility concerning novelist m oral 
considerations entail then a dialog between what is in the fictional frame, and what is out of it. 
What fictions helps us to understand belongs to  reality. But it differs from  descriptive or 
theoretical explanation because it is much more an interpretation of it than a knowledge about 
it. On one side, there are pure hypothesis, on th e other side, future thesis. The intentional 
discourse in fictions can not be corroborated or confirmed by means of empirical experiences, 
observations or experimentations. Yet, we could judge that a fiction is not credible or lacks 
authenticity, if the interpretation of the reality it proposes seems partial or incoherent. Validity 
then results from the application of  some criteria like f or example the unity of  the narrative 
plot, the respect of good m anners, the laws of the literary genus, and of course, the way it 
echoes with real data – human feelings, human behaviors, social functioning, etc. 
Consequently, fiction and reality do support m any links; they enrich one another. Fictional 
universes possess a lot of  similarities with the real one – objects, rules, individuals, spaces – 
and on the other hand, reality blends fictional parts – nam e of som e characters, possible 
interpretations of events. Even if the latter seems to be an analogical relation, it is still a 
relation, and we just need that idea! So, fictions are indispensable, because they are useful and 
non-reducible, and they are indispensable to our understanding of the single shared reality. 
If so, we can f ollow the line of  the Indisp ensability Argument and directly claim  that 
fictions, because they are specifically indispensable for a better understanding of the world, 
are true. We managed then to enter the fictiona l discourse within the scope of som e serious 
practical contributions about reality. Incidenta lly it shows that our concept of truth is not 
antirealist: even when applied to non-descriptiv e discourses it is still linked to reality via 
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practice, as is stated by the Indispensability Argument.24 But of course, it may be odd: fictions 
are telling us som ething true, being sim ultaneously false illusionary creations of  our minds. 
That is why we must precise the nature of these fictional truths. 
Does it follow the schem e of the truth-corre spondence, based on Aristotle’s definition of 
adequatio intellectus et rei – “to say of what it is that it is” is true ? It cannot obviously be the 
case here, because fictional discourse is by definition out of a direct descriptive relation to the 
real things. Then is it a built truth, only occurri ng inside the fictional domain? But we would 
be confronted to the problem  of the literal true statements we can read in a story. In short, 
how is the concept of truth modified when applied to fictions, and in which sense do we claim 
the existence of  something true in and f rom them? The point is no m ore to argue for the 
acknowledgement of som e truth for fiction, for we consider it now granted by their 
indispensability. However indispensability only delim itates the extension of  the concept of  
truth, and one can hope for m ore than that. In order to sketch out som e more intensional 
account, we will take care of what literary critic ism, philosophy of art and effective practices 
of writers and readers say about this matter. 
 
3. Truth of fictions and truths from fiction 
According to Lamarque and Olsen, there would be no reason to consider the notion of truth as 
a central one when we critically analyze fictions  and try to characterize their aesthetic value 
(1994). Let’s be clear once again: we do not pret end to calculate the power of fictions in 
regards to their truth degrees; we just argue th at, because they are practically useful, they do 
present to us, among others, some true interpretations of the world and som e true intentional 
hypothesis about human businesses. The kind of tr uth they involve is rather objective than 
personal, even if there can be different subj ective ways through which one character sees the 
world. Truths from fictions are public and deba table, for they are spread and m ade objective 
by the writing itself. 
We have to precise that there are many sorts of truths within a story: fictional truths are next 
to non-fictional serious referential ones. In other words, we must distinguish, here again, those 
which are specific to a narrative treatm ent of som e subjects. Jum ping ahead the 
demonstration, we can notice that they are, like their utility, characterized by an essential 
interdependency between content and form . As from the moment we would be able to m ake 
the propositional content autonom ous, then rises the suspicion of a reducible truth, apt to 
occur in a theoretical discourse. 
Some distinctions are therefore necessary to de termine the very nature of  truth in f ictions: 
on the one hand, the difference between propositional and non-propositional truths, and on the 
other hand, between literal and non-literal truths. We will see further how it works. Moreover, 
it is important to keep in mind the slight difference between what is true and what belongs to 
the notion of  verisimilitude – as Aristotle def ines it in his Poetics –, f or it is sure that the 
moral and modal quest of novelists pertains to it.25 
3.1. The possible eliminability of factual propositional truths26 
                                                 
24 Our proposal mainly consists in widening the scope of the concept or truth. Truth of descriptive discourse can 
be viewed in many ways compatible with the Indispensability Argument, hence still being compatible with our 
account. 
25 See Genette (1969: 74) about the difference between the notion of verisimilitude and the notion of motivation. 
26 Eliminating the factual truths which occur in fictions is possible, that it to  say it is possible to extract them 
from the story, but it is obviously impossible for the novel itself to run without, unless being another one. 
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When we read a novel, we sometimes read statements which are literally true, i.e. referential 
and for which the schem e of truth-correspondence does apply. Of course, these propositions 
are what J. M. Schaeffer calls “the tracks of  the non-fictional universe within the fictional 
universe” (2008: 79). They can actually be checked  by em pirical facts. At this first level, 
being true means being sticking to the reality.  
The entire documentary dimension of novels co mes under this kind of truth. The plot will 
have an historical and social context which has really existed or actually exists. This is the 
case of naturalist novels which give us inform ation about the conditions of the French society 
at that time. Fiction is then apt to provide some true account for historians: novelists do the 
job of registering various facts. Zola’s use of exact nam es of tools m anipulated by each 
corporate body illustrates it, such as Hugo’s w ill to integrate slang within his writing or 
DeLillo’s approach to f inancial operations which really happen in our (crazy) world. 
Moreover, novelists can use real persons as  characters for their story, incorporating 
biographical data within the narration. For exam ple, S. Strindberg recently wrote a novel for 
which the principle character is Valérie Solana s, the woman who really tried to m urder Andy 
Warhol. 
Another kind of literal truth com es from the theoretical dim ension of various fictions. The 
didactic aim of m any of them , the encyclope dic tendency of novels which integrate fixed 
knowledge, the essayist aspect realized by the pr esence of digressions or abstract m editations 
within the story are occurrences of  this intrus ion of serious discourse inside the fictional 
world. 
We do agree with the conclusion that it does not allow us to say neither that f ictions are 
indispensable for doing that job, nor  that there really exists som e fictional truths: this kind of 
truth is not specific to the fic tion, since we can reduce it to serious statements about true facts 
already known. Nevertheless, it allows us to make two comments:27  
(i) Factual propositional truths in fictions perm it to give an account of effective practices, 
those of readers and of writers (see Fraisse  & Mouralis 2001: 196). A reader can find and 
learn some true information during his fictional pastime. A writer may want to use his or her 
novel to spread on som e true but not enough known facts. For exam ple, literature from  
formerly colonized countries can be considered  as having often been built on this willing to 
show the reality of a culture, a nation. 
(ii) This kind of referential truth is what we will use to give an account of the literal truth of 
true statements in the fiction. In another words,  it is clear that fictional truths are based on 
many ordinary empirical truths about which we obviously agree. When a novelist for example 
writes that his character is eating such and such meal, or walking on such and such street, it is 
nothing more than what we notice as being true in our everyday life. However, this is exactly 
what science-fiction or fantastic novels will m odify, specifying that, for exam ple, in this 
fictional world, human beings fly or eat pure red energy-bubbles. 
3.2. Interpreting facts: a two-level truth 
Besides non-fictional truths, it seem s that ther e are som e truths em erging from a fictional 
frame of investigation. This is the case of so me statements which can be considered as 
literally true (non m etaphorical), but im possible to em pirically certify, and non referential. 
They propose instead an interpretation of fact s, a particular understanding of things which 
                                                 
27 Besides the fact that it is still an  argument in favor of the idea that there is indeed something true within the 
fictional language, although almost trivially. It might be useful to notice it in order to dismiss radical claims such 
as those of “contra-truth” for which it is  said that there is no reason at all to  keep talking about truth into critical 
analysis of literature. 
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happen in our real world and of hum an behaviors, relative to a general viewpoint or to the 
point of view of one character. 
Indeed, when Balzac (1842) confesses that he tr ied not only to reproduce a sort of mirror of 
the society, but also to explain something like the “hidden signification” of the architecture of 
social and psychological facts, then he was tr ying to produce som e true statements different 
from descriptive ones. These propositions expressed by what we call the “present tense of 
general truth” are a m atter for a second-level truth which is not anym ore an adequacy to 
factual realities but an explanative hypothesis am ong others which is offered by the fictional 
frame. As he wanted to describe the spirit of his time, he was actually interpreting f acts, and 
these interpretations are what we m ay judge as a form of novelist truth. So, efforts of global 
understanding of a particular situation imply propositional truths, but non-reducible. 
Besides the construction of true expressions about social contexts, novelists seem  to be 
concerned to say some truths about our feelings and vague impressions, about human passions 
or mental states. Fictions take in charge psychological paintings, for which truth is not 
anymore factual but deals with th e inner life of a person. It appears to be really specific to 
fictions because this is precisely a fictional treatment which can develop that sort of thought. 
For example, Sade claims that the novel depict s “the truth of hum an being when leaving his 
mask”, and latter judges this picture as “m uch more interesting and at the sam e time truer” 
(1800:54). This intentional truth is theref ore only possible through the narrative dynam ic 
dimension of fictions; and so, the characteriza tion – which here means both to specify and to 
create a character – involves the production of what R. Barthes calls the “truth of affects” 
(1978). 
We might bring some reservations to the idea that these truths are literal; they are m ostly 
literal. But in the perspective we adopt at this  point, we could also include the practice of 
some novelists to give the power of language to those who lacks it in the real world: angels, 
deads, trees, animals and so on. In this case, tr ue statements appear to be quite m etaphorical. 
They are a form of intuitive understanding of wh at is beyond us, and therefore an attem pt to 
make sense. 
All in all, the reason why f ictional treatment is desirable for it is the nature of objects in 
question: meanings of events as they are e xperienced, perceived or projected in m any ways, 
human heart, inanim ate entities, dream s and s ubconscious thoughts, as well as life itself, 
meanings of life and reasons to accept the existence we have, cannot be the rei of the truth 
conception as adequatio. However, their occurrence within a fictional discourse can have as a 
result to be close to som ething true, f or they are m erged into the global  tendency of 
understanding. Being true means here that we judge it as likely to what we really feel or think, 
how we act in our life, or how things appear to signify for us. But this truth is not reducible to 
clear and exact form ulas; they are vaguely referential truths, m ixed with their narrative 
expression. 
Because fictions are oriented to a m oral axiological interrogation, as T. Pavel (2003), J. 
Bouveresse (2008), M. Nussbaum (1995) and many others claim, then it seems that we must 
modify and extend the concept of truth to give an account of it. Like we formerly said, there is 
no single valid interpretations of hum an attitudes, no scientific truths about the relations 
between human beings, or about one’s right pos ition in the world. We do not know what true 
fixed principles we would have to follow in order to lead a good life! Nevertheless, because 
fictions are indispensable to clear up our m ind about this kind of deep existential questions, 
one can think that they say something true about it. 
In this perspective, J. Bouveresse consider s that a novel fulfils this function when it 
develops a “situation of problem ” in the m ost likely, plausible and relevant way (2008: 49). 
 23
This likeness is next to the idea of the “truth of a person”, and it goes through the 
representation of his or her entire story, as Eng lish moral realists have tried to do. Therefore 
we follow D. Rozakis when he asserts that  fictions, by m eans of reconstitutions and 
redefinitions endlessly iterated about the “ possible content of an entire life” (2009: 78), 
propose different interpretations of hum an behaviors and reasons why we act such and such. 
Truths of fictions are of an herm eneutical kind, and consequently neither elim inable nor 
definitive. 
3.3. Irreducible and specific truths: four features 
The very specif ic kind of  fictional truth is quite global and intuitive, and rather of  a 
conceptual order – we follow here Bouveresse’s claim (2008). It is hard to isolate what is true 
within a fictional story, because it appears to us as a fluid whole, and not stricto sensu 
expressed by a propositional form . So, we could say that truths from  fictions deal with 
“monstration” rather than diction, even if it seem s paradoxical at first blush for the case of 
novels. But it m eans what W ittgenstein calls to mind when claim ing although in another 
context that what can not be said, can still be shown (1921: 6.522): in a way, what is true in 
the fiction cannot be reduced to a few words, but passes through lines without clearly standing 
into some linguistic close form ulas. We will now present four feat ures which draw the 
specificity of the concept of fictional truth. 
(i) Links to falsehood and game. Of course, it seem s to be contradictory that being true 
depends in this situation of  what is literally  false. But it actually m eans that the way how 
truths come to light depends on the illusionary dimension of stories. As J. M. Schaef fer 
(2008) outlines, the particular m odes of reception and m ental processes which give us an 
access to fictional universes are im mersion and, especially, simulation; they both determ ine 
which characteristic aspects fictional truths do possess. 
So, illusion is indispensable to f iction which is indispensable to elaborate interpretative 
truths. The pretense dimension partly defines so me properties of fictional truths. W e have to 
act as if it was literally true, and then we m ight be able to understand how it can be true as 
well about the world, in an analogical and intentional way. W e have to invent stories and 
characters in order to create an appropriate fr ame for some true statements which cannot be 
expressed otherwise.  
This feature is moreover close to the ironic and playful dimension of fictional truths. In fact, 
many authors do enjoy the freedom to cloud the supposedly unbridgeable boundaries between 
what is true and what is f alse, in the very sense of what is real and wh at in fictional – we can 
for example look at som e prefaces by Montes quieu, Laclos or Rousseau (in Montalbetti 
2001). Like the strange and soft way of expressing true things in fiction, fictional truths 
themselves seem to display an ironic nature. 
(ii) Links to the questioning form. This is mostly due to the incompleteness of fictions and 
their spirit of  complexity. Then truths can be characterized as being unfinished broken up 
intuitions with an evasive and changing dim ension. They appears to be problem atic and not 
checkable, undeterminable and som etimes paradoxical. Worse, they do not always follow 
logical rules when compared to one another. In this perspective, they can be considered as not 
systematic and quite provisory. 
 But then, are we really allowed to speak of  truths? Yes we are, f or the intentional 
aspect of language, as we already showed, do not  answer to the sam e requirements than the 
use of descriptive or theoretical discourse. In  the case of fiction, there is no unicity of 
significations, and novels have actually to respect  the possibility of different interpretations 
about the world. For these reasons, it is im portant to outline the plural form  of the term , ie. 
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truths, for it would be erroneous to assert the exis tence of one Truth of fiction. Furtherm ore, 
novelists create some sort of unknown truths and it is not rare that many of them confess they 
do not know themselves at which kind of interpretations they will end up: truths from fictions 
are not conclusions implied by stated well-formed premises. 
(iii) Links to words. The concept of fictional truths is  more precisely inseparable to a 
linguistic work.28 It means that when we read a novel, we can pick up som e narrative truths, 
i.e. developed within a narrative schem e, but we can also discover truths which depend on 
words themselves, like analogical or m etaphorical truths. This verbal dim ension is m aybe 
close to our natural tendency for telling stories in order to make sense – this anthropological 
aspect of fictions has been studied for exam ple by J. Molino & R. Lafhail-Molino (2003): the 
intentional use of language allows us to form ulate different significant hypothesis about some 
ordinary situations. Words, in that case, are useful to make a “situation of problem ” clearer 
and apt to be cognitively controlled. 
Novels sometimes allow a sort of  external “typification” of som e names or narrative 
sequences; the reader will isolate them  and then possibly apply it to real phenom enon or 
individuals. For exam ple, we have in m ind Peter Pan’s type which analogically apply to 
someone who refuses to grow up, the bovarysm , next to Don Quixote’s model, characterizing 
someone who confuses dreams or fictions with reality, or even the m ental process illustrated 
by Proust’s madeleine. Similarly, Balzacian “types” shed light on human behaviors.29 Fictions 
are used for real data being named, a way for the formers to pretend to a kind of truth. W hich 
one? Something like what N. Frye defines as “allegorical incidences” (1957). 
Truths from fictions are intrinsically linked to  words, for the reason that they express som e 
real features, by instance, em otions, for which “we do not have words at our disposal before 
reading a novel” (see Rozakis 2009: 117). Alike De scombes’ idea of a possible expansion of 
our vocabulary by m eans of fictional language , we m ight claim that, when there is no 
adequate term to correctly and directly describe  the nature of some human attitudes, then this 
is the function of a developed plot to give us the ability to understand what is involved. Take a 
look at, for example, Alexis’ long letter in M. Yourcenar’s short story, Alexis ou le Traité du 
vain combat (1927), who needs so m any pages to barely m anage to explain to his wife the 
failure of their m arriage. So novels do not only attempt to nam e moral and psychological 
motivations we could actually realize; they esp ecially try to “forge subtler languages” than 
ordinary one, and truths they carry on are then in straight connection with them. 
(iv) Links to the possible. The fourth feature is certainly the most important one, because it 
actually overhangs the three others. Let’s say now that the very specif icity of truths fictions 
express is linked to the m odal and deontic notion of possibility. Truths have to be considered 
as dealing with (1) ontological possibilities and (2) interpretative possibilities. 
 (1) On the one hand, novels seem  to offer some forms of what is possible without 
having ever been realized. This is the case of  utopias and thought experiences of which R. 
Musil’s novel is a paradigmatical picture. In this perspective, truths concern what does not yet 
happen, what could happen, what will maybe happen, that is what does not actually exist. This 
is why we bring nearer the concept of  verisimilitude which means, in a way, what is possibly 
true in the real world, and really true in a possi ble fictional universe. This kind of truth is not 
                                                 
28 Obviously, this point concerns more particularly the case of novel; movies answer to another kind of medium 
specificity. In general, fictional truths are linked to the form which expresses them – straight connection between 
form and content. 
29 We agree with J. Pouillon (1946: 94) who notices that “the type is what makes us understand something, rather 
than what is understood. [...] We see the real world through Balzac’s eyes, we begin to find Balzacian characters 
everywhere”. 
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eliminable because it formulates possibilities which have never been instantiated. They com e 
from the prospective dim ension of fictions, inventing and imagining human possibilities of  
existence. According to J. M. Schaeffer, ficti on is therefore a “virtual  exemplification of a 
possible being-in-the-world” (2008: 80).  
Modal possibilities are close to the sam e but deontic notion f or both of them appear as an 
attempt to improve our moral thoughts and choices; the question is how to attain a good life. 
Following J. Bouveresse, the very object of novelis t investigation is precisely this sort of 
practical truth. And once again, he says that the understanding from  fictions is not at all 
“similar to knowledge of theoretical propositional science, for it is directly relative to the 
question of how we can or should live” (2008: 63). 
  (2) On the other hand, novels are deali ng with many possibilities of m eanings about 
what there is. Possible interpretations and po ssible world-conceptions express this m odal 
hermeneutical kind of truth. It is really clos e to Putnam’s idea (1978) according to which the 
novel teaches us “to see the world as it looks lik e for someone who is sure this hypothesis is 
valid”. Novels do then propose som ething like an hypothesis at first tim e, which they assume 
and develop through the story and which they m odify in accordance with the transform ations 
of characters.  
Putnam asserts that novels permit us to be conscious of a new interpretation of facts and that 
it builds up a kind of true knowledge: “this is the knowledge of a possibility, he wrote. This is 
a conceptual knowledge’ (1978), due to the writer’s intuition – we should precise it is the 
conjunction of the writer’s intuition and the reader’s reception. But Putnam  has a problem: an 
intuition is not really a knowledge, because know ledge must be based on a scientifically 
checked verification. Then novels would not be allowed to express som e truths, as it is 
impossible to scientifically know if it is true. 
This kind of problem  leads us to prefer another definition of what Putnam  calls a 
“knowledge”; in our perspective, what he is cl aiming is correct, but only if we translate “the 
knowledge of a possibility” from  its theoretical  sense to its interpretative one as an 
understanding. The reason is that the intentiona l use of fictional language gives us an 
apprehension of life’s signification, which is s till not apt to be confirm ed in any ways by 
facts.30  
So truths of fictions are from a global level. They  concern real human possibilities as well 
as possibilities of  various interpretations. Both of them are quite inf inite and then im ply 
impossibilities of reduction. By this way, we preserve the applicability of fictional truths but 
without assuming a directly referential relation to  reality. Here, being true does not m ean that 
life is accurately represented within the fictiona l frame but rather that, as M. Backtine said, 
“life itself is able to enter the novel” (1978). Th e truth criteria would then be form ulated as 
follow: does the novel remain outside life and beside  reality, this reality that it is supposed to 
take into consideration?31 
Additional remarks 
What really accounts for now is to accept the idea that fictions, because they are practically 
indispensable, do say something true about human beings and the world in which we live and 
act, think and feel, something true about its meaning and the multiple interpretations we may 
                                                 
30 Fictions can also be considered as im proving our modal faculties, being a way to  experiment our modal 
judgments about what is possible and what seem to be impossible, in such and such situation. 
31 See also V. Woolf (1927). 
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propose. All of it depends on an intentional use of language which is undoubtedly different 
from a descriptive use. 
One obvious benefit of this conception is that the question of truth in fiction is given as 
independent from the question of the existe nce of fictional entities. W e do not suppose 
anymore that this kind of truth fictions e xpress is relative to the correspondence schem e. 
Truths are implied by their indispensable role, and not by a (necessarily failing) reference to 
empirically real facts. Therefore, nove list understanding for exam ple does not only  concern 
what exists, but rather what could possibly exist if such and such, in such and such situation, 
according to such and such m odalities, and it concerns also the possible m eanings we could 
give to what exists. Incidentally, our concepti on implies that fictions which are useless – in 
the sense where they would not provide any new ability to their readers, like pulp literature – 
are definitely not true.  
A requirement as well as an im plication of our proposal is that we can not anym ore strictly 
isolate fictional worlds from  the actual one. As soon as we claim  that fictions are useful to 
understand real phenomenon, we are committed to the approval of a straight contact between 
them. We will however precise that f ictional worlds do not superimpose possible worlds, for 
it may be the case of  impossible fictional universes – like, by instance, in f antastic literature. 
Possible worlds do the job of conceptually joining fictional and real worlds, without involving 
any kind of equivalency. 
We will end up to the debate about storytelling practices (hereafter ST; see Ch. Salm on 
2007). The reason is that the necessity to disti nguish ST from novelist practices can be used 
for an argum ent in favor of the porosity betw een fictional and real world. Firstly, we can 
observe that in both cases there is a sim ilar fictional discourse, but with different functions. 
ST gives a full power to the “termites of reduction” until they manage to impose to people one 
single interpretation of the story. According to what we formerly claimed, this is a counter 
natural process for fictions, for their very specificity is to be multi-interpretable. The spirit of 
complexity vanishes into biased simplifications. 
Secondly, the joint between fiction and reality is also different. ST denies what is real in 
order to create another chosen reality, deliberately misleading or at least due to one’s own free 
will for instrumental ends. ST consciously trie s to cut of the connection between the wrong  
fallacious representation they extract from fictions and the true reality, substituting the former 
for the latter. In order to differentiate these two uses, we then need to admit that there actually 
is an outer reality which m akes true m any fictional statements and interpretations. And so 
novels are not separated from  the world. Fictions  are helpful for us to understand som e real 
irreducible aspects of reality, without choosing them and without corrupting it. 
 
 
Conclusion 
Roughly said, Frege, Russell and Quine reject ed fictions as being non-serious, thus 
uninterested by truth. However fictions play a cen tral and particular role in our hum an lives: 
this is the m ain reason why we cannot be satis fied with such approaches. W e argued that 
fictional narrations should not be considered as  descriptive: what one can learn from  them 
irreducibly is nothing but ways of interpreting others and the world. So fictional narrations 
should not be processed like descriptive or theoretical discourse. However, theoretical 
discourse is the target of Quine’s criterion of  ontological com mitment, as well as that of 
Quine-Putnam’s indispensability argument.  
 27
We proposed to clearly detach two parts within the indispensability argum ent: (i) the 
implication from indispensability to truth, and (ii) the implication from truth to ontology. The 
second part actually is Quine’s ontological criteri on. If the argument is to be transposed from  
theoretical to fictional discourse, then one can retain (i) but should give up (ii). 
The implication from truth to ontology (ii) is specific to theoretical discourse, if not to first-
order formalized theories. The developm ent of NL sem antics since the 1970s reveals how 
insufficient hence inadequate is first-order logic to account for m any linguistic phenomena. 
Fine-grained analyses, especially those provi ded since the dynam ic turn in NL sem antics, 
emphasized the need of explanations of how peopl e interpret discourse in context, rather than 
static descriptions of meanings of expressions in isolated eternal sentences. Doing such a task, 
semanticists promoted two-level theories, i.e. th e addition of a kind of “internal level” to the 
usual model-theoretic one. The way linguistic interpretation is handled is thus made relatively 
independent of the representative level, that is of the external connection between language 
and world. Obviously (ii) concerns the represen tative dimension of semantics, and not at all 
the procedural one. At the internal level, one can account for som e kind of truth of a 
discourse, with no relation to the world, hence with no ontological commitment. 
Nevertheless, only a half of the way has been m ade. Such a truth is indeed a weak one: it is 
internal and cannot be considered as serious . Assuming (i), we argued that fiction, being 
indispensable, is true in a strong sense. It does not mean at all that fictional narrations have a 
descriptive dimension, i.e. that they describe the world in som e specific manner. The strong 
sense of truth comes from a connection to the world, but a connection that is strictly different 
from representation. As fictional narration is  no description, the correspondence theory of 
truth is clearly out of place. W e used analyses by literary criticism  and philosophy of art to 
account for the specificity of fictional truths. Trut h in fiction intervenes at a global level, and 
it is connected to m odality: because fictions offe r many interpretations, their truth is that of 
the interpretative possibilities they let explore. In a way, this can be conceived of as in relative 
accordance with Lewis’ and m any philosophers’ idea to account for the sem antic of fictions 
using possible world semantics. 
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